Whistleblowing intentions among public accountants in Indonesia: testing for the moderation effects by Latan, Hengky et al.
Whistleblowing Intentions among Public Accountants in 
Indonesia: Testing for the Moderation Effects 
 
 
Hengky Latan 
Universitas Diponegoro, Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Accounting, Indonesia 
Jl. Erlangga Tengah 17, Semarang 50241, Indonesia 
Phone/Fax: +62 248452273 
E-mail: latanhengky@gmail.com 
 
Christian M. Ringle 
Hamburg University of Technology (TUHH), Am-Schwarzenberg-Campus 4 (D), 21073 Hamburg, Germany 
Phone/Fax: +49 40 42878-4419   
E-mail: c.ringle@tuhh.de 
 
Charbel Jose Chiappetta Jabbour 
University of Stirling, Management School, Centre for Sustainable Practice and Living, Stirling FK9 4LA, 
Scotland, UK  
Phone/Fax: + 44 1786 473171 
E-mail: c.j.chiappettajabbour@stir.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7LWOH3DJHFRQWDLQLQJDOODXWKRUVFRQWDFWGHWDLOV
Whistleblowing Intentions among Public Accountants in 
Indonesia: Testing for the Moderation Effects 
 
 
Abstract 
Our study contributes by providing new insights into the relationship between the 
individual levels of the antecedents and how the intention of whistleblowing is 
moderated by perceived organizational support (POS), team norms (TNs) and 
perceived moral intensity (PMI). In this paper, we argue that the intention of both 
internal and external whistleblowing depends on the individual-level antecedents 
(attitudes toward wistleblowing [ATW], perceived behavioral control [PBC], 
independence commitment [IC], personal responsibility for reporting [PRR] and 
personal cost of reporting [PCR]) and is moderated by POS, TNs and PMI. The 
findings confirm our predictions. Data was collected using an online survey on 256 
Indonesian public accountants who worked in the audit firm affiliated with the Big 4 
and non-Big 4. The results support the argument that all the antecedents of individual 
levels can improve the auditors’ intention to blow the whistle (internally and 
externally). The nature of the relationship is more complex than analysis by adding 
moderating variables using the Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling 
(PLS-SEM) approach. We find that POS, TNs and PMI can partially improve the 
relationship between the individual-level antecedents and whistleblowing intentions. 
These findings indicate that the POS, TNs and PMI are a mechanism or that attribute 
is important in controlling behavior. 
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1. Introduction 
More recently the public was shocked by corporate scandals in which the 
main actor was a whistleblower.1 The last case that put whistleblowing in the 
headlines of the news media was about telephone tapping and hacking cases 
involving the National Security Agency (NSA) and Edward Snowden leaked 
documents that were meant to be secret (Archambeault and Webber 2015). This 
suggests that the role of whistleblowers in detecting errors is crucial. On one hand, 
managers / supervisors often learn from mistakes in their company only when 
someone blows the whistle about the mistake (Near and Miceli 1985, 2016). On the 
other hand, a whistleblower may face many obstacles, suffer from the negative 
impact on his personal and professional life (such as increased levels of stress or loss 
of reputation), and run the risk of retaliation (Izraeli and Jaffe 1998; Liyanarachchi 
and Adler 2011; Webber and Archambeault 2015). Given the low public visibility 
and the high technical complexity of many illegal activities in the company, the 
success of the monitoring and detection of financial fraud depends largely on auditor 
(Chiu 2002). However, the auditor cannot be separated from ethical issues related to 
his work and can also observe the behavior violations of the professional code of 
conduct among fellow coworkers (Alleyne et al. 2016; Bedard et al. 2008). 
The interest of academics on this issue was indicated by the development 
and testing of several models of research associated with the intention to blow the 
whistle on audit firms (Alleyne et al. 2016; Curtis and Taylor 2009; Robertson et al. 
2011; Seifert et al. 2014; Taylor and Curtis 2010, 2013; Wainberg and Perreault 
2016). However, the existing models do not show how the role of the organizational 
support / team norms and moral intensity possessed the auditor to arrive at causal 
explanation and assessment of responsibility for the perceived mistakes that caused 
the auditor’s decision to blow the whistle. Organizational support will eliminate the 
fear of retaliation when the auditor will report wrong-doings. While the team norms 
                                                 
1 Whistleblowing is “the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral,  
or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be 
   able to affect action” (Near & Miceli, 1985, p. 4). 
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and moral intensity assist the auditor when faced with an ethical dilemma. These 
factors become key elements of the auditor's decision to blow the whistle. As stated 
by Alleyne et al. (2013), previous studies have responded and proposed a model of 
whistleblowing, but fail to capture all of the important factors for the context of 
external audit. Alleyne et al. (2013) proposed a new model for whistleblowing, but 
this model has not been validated empirically. Therefore, the purpose of this study 
was to validate the model developed by Alleyne et al. (2013) for the Indonesian 
context. 
Indonesia offers an interesting phenomenon to study because it is one 
country in Southeast Asia that has increased corporate governance significantly in 
2015, according to data from the Indonesian Institute for Corporate Directorship 
(IICD). That is evidenced by Indonesia recently adopting International Accounting 
Standards such as International Standards on Auditing (ISA) and International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Besides, according to data from the 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiner (ACFE), in 2015, Indonesia was one of five 
countries in the world experiencing the largest fraud cases after South Africa, India, 
Nigeria and China. This indicates that Indonesia provides the right setting for testing 
models of whistleblowing, while previous studies have also been conducted in 
Barbados (Alleyne 2016; Alleyne et al. 2016), China (Liu et al. 2015; Zhang et al. 
2009), South Africa (Maroun and Gowar 2013; Maroun and Solomon 2014), Turkey 
(Erkmen et al. 2014; Nayir and Herzig 2012), New Zealand (Liyanarachchi and 
Newdick 2009), Taiwan (Hwang et al. 2008), South Korea (Park and Blenkinsopp 
2009), Ireland (Brennan and Kelly 2007), Australia (Cassematis and Wortley 2013; 
Liyanarachchi and Adler 2011), Germany (Pittroff 2014) and U.S (MacGregor and 
Stuebs 2014; Robinson et al. 2012). However, research in Indonesia still leaves an 
empirical gap. In addition, we believe that the high cases of fraud discovered by the 
ACFE in Indonesia, are an indication that the auditors or public accountants in 
Indonesia are still reluctant to become a whistleblowers. So it is important to examine 
what factors are instrumental in improving the intention of whistleblowing public 
accountants in Indonesia. 
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Our study contributes to the current literature in several ways. First, this is 
the first study to test the model of whistleblowing proposed by Alleyne et al. (2013), 
where there are many factors that have not been tested and included in previous 
studies in a single comprehensive model. Thus, this study answers the call from 
Alleyne et al. (2013) to test their model in external audit functions. Although Alleyne 
et al. (2016) tested this model on a public accountant in Barbados, the models they 
tested incomplete.2 Second, this study reconciles evidence mixture of whistleblowing 
intentions for the Indonesian context, whereas previous studies provide inconsistent 
evidence for the relationship between variables. For example, Alleyne et al. (2016) 
found that intentions for whistleblowing were internally affected by attitudes and 
externally influenced by perceived behavioral control (PBC), while Izraeli and Jaffe 
(1998), Park and Blenkinsopp (2009), Buchan (2005), Carpenter and Reimers (2005) 
found no association. Instead, Dalton and Radtke (2013) found no association 
between the personal cost of reporting (PCR) with the intention of whistleblowing, 
while Alleyne et al. (2016) found that relationship. 
Third, this study extends state-of-the art research on whistleblowing by 
providing evidence from Indonesia. Based on our best knowledge, this is the first 
study conducted in Indonesia that tests the intentions of whistleblowing on a public 
accountant. Because there are no empirical results available from Indonesia on 
whistleblowing in the context of accounting, this study provides initial evidence of 
the importance of individual and organizational factors in support of whistleblowing 
intentions on public accountants (Alleyne et al. 2013; Mesmer-Magnus and 
Viswesvaran 2005). Finally, it is important to conduct this study with experienced 
professionals such as CPAs, who experience real-life ethical dilemmas that may be 
different from those outside the professional organizations (Curtis and Taylor 2009). 
Previous studies have used students (Gao et al. 2015), internal auditors (Alleyne 
2016; Robinson et al. 2012; Seifert et al. 2014), managers (Nayir and Herzig 2012) 
                                                 
2 Alleyne et al. (2016) examined the influence of individual-level antecedents to the intention of 
whistleblowing by using only POS as a moderating variable. But they ignore the other moderating 
variables such as TNs and PMI. 
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and employees (Cassematis and Wortley 2013; Liu et al. 2015). However, few studies 
have used public accountants as a sample. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section 
presents the development of the hypotheses, followed by the research method 
employed. Next, we discuss our results. Finally, we discuss the results and provide 
important implications of our study as well as its limitations. 
2. Theoretical Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Whistleblowing as Pro-Social Behavior and the Mechanisms of Justice 
The act of whistle-blowing can be framed as a pro-social part of the 
contemporary corporate governance system (Maroun and Atkins, 2014), which has 
synergy with mechanisms for promoting justice in organisations. From this 
perspective, whistleblowing is seen as a positive behavior (not selfish and altruistic) 
conducted without a specific purpose (such as reward or praise) and the action is in 
line with social norms (Brennan & Kelly, 2007; Dozier & Miceli, 1985; Seifert, 
Sweeney, Joireman, & Thornton, 2010). Whistleblowing and corporate governance 
are linked because both of them aim to promote organisational effectiveness, 
corporate social responsibility and employee empowerment (Callahan, Dworkin, 
Fort, & Schipani, 2002; Vandekerckhove, 2006). As described by Callahan et al. 
(2002), unifying these significant contemporary organisational trends offers an 
opportunity for organisations to improve their efficiency when relating to 
stakeholders, increase employee morale, reduce risk-related damages to reputation, 
and boost ethical behaviour throughout the corporate context. According to Vera-
Munoz (2005), whistle-blower provisions to handle anonymous misconduct is one of 
the pillars that sustain the corporate governance reforms and framework adopted by 
modern U.S. 
Whistleblowing act can be characterized as pro-social empowered 
behaviour driven both by voluntary and duty-related disclosures of wrongdoing. A 
pro-social behaviour is intended to be socially beneficial and motivated, although 
exceptions can be noticed, such as revenge (Seifert et al., 2010) and others 
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dysfunctions (Maroun& Atkins, 2014) . In this context, theory of organizational 
justice has the potential to contribute to the implementation of effective 
whistleblowing mechanisms because research has indicated a positive relationship 
between its justice dimensions and pro-social behaviours (Seifert et al., 2010; Soni, 
Maroun, & Padia, 2015). When subordinates feel treated fairly, they will tend to have 
pro-social behavior againts the company, thus increasing the possibility to report 
wrong-doings. 
In some countries, including Indonesia, there are policies or regulations 
governing whistleblowing.3 Indeed, in Indonesia the issue of whistleblowing received 
attention in 1998, precisely during the economic crisis. The system of corporate 
governance that is weak in Indonesia led to wrong-doings difficult to detect. To that 
end, the National Committee on Governance as the pioneer of whistleblowing in 
Indonesia introduced a system which can prevent violations in the Company. Every 
company in Indonesia currently has a whistleblowing system to support good 
corporate governance. Some rules were made for the protection of wistleblower in 
Indonesia such as Law No. 13 of 2006. However, the Whistleblower Protection Act 
(WPA) in Indonesia has not fully protect whistleblowers from various risks and 
retaliation. 
In this paper, we tested the whistleblowing conceptual model developed 
by Alleyne et al. (2013), in which there are five factors of individuals who become 
antecedents / predictors for attitudes toward whistleblowing (ATW), perceived 
behavioral control (PBC), independence commitment (IC), personal responsibility for 
reporting (PRR) and personal cost of reporting (PCR ), with three moderating 
variables, namely perceived organizational support (POS), team norms (TNs) and 
perceived moral intensity (PMI) that affect whistleblowing intentions both internally 
and externally. Furthermore, the development of hypotheses for this research will be 
described. First, the hypothesis of the direct relationship between the variables is 
                                                 
3 See Vandekerckhove (2006) for a description of the whistleblowing system in some other countries 
such as U.S, Australia, New Zealand, U.K, South Africa, Japan, Belgium and Germany. 
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presented, followed by the hypothesis of the interaction between variables. Figure 1 
presents a conceptual model that will be tested in this study. 
2.2. Attitudes toward Whistleblowing and Whistleblowing Intentions 
Ajzen (2005) stated that the attitude is the disposition to respond 
positively or not, either for an object, person, institution or event. The theory of 
planned behavior (TPB) found that attitude is strongly predictive of behavioral 
intentions (Ajzen 2005). Attitude will have a direct influence on the intentions of the 
whistleblowing to assess how favorably or unfavorably individuals blow the whistle 
(Alleyne et al. 2013; Izraeli and Jaffe 1998). This is also in line with the expectation 
theory proposed by Vroom (1964), where potential whistleblowers report (action) 
offense only if they hope such measures provide the expected results.4 Previous 
research has found a significant relationship between attitudes and intentions of 
whistleblowing (Alleyne et al. 2016; Park and Blenkinsopp 2009; Trongmateerut and 
Sweeney 2013), ethical behavior (Alleyne and Phillips 2011; Bobek and Hatfield 
2003; Bobek et al. 2007; Buchan 2005; Carpenter and Reimers 2005; Cieslewicz 
2016) and sustainability reporting (Thoradeniya et al. 2015). From the above 
discussion, the following hypothesis can be derived: 
H1: Attitude toward whistleblowing has a positive effect on both internal and 
external whistleblowing intentions. 
2.3. Perceived Behavioral Control and Whistleblowing Intentions 
 PBC is the individual’s perception of how easy or difficult it is to 
perform certain behaviors depending on the resources and opportunities that exist 
(Ajzen 2005). For example, a public accountant would have a dilemma when he 
wanted to blow the whistle on colleagues or superiors as an audit partner who signed 
the audit report that is free from material misstatement in the financial statements 
misleading (Alleyne et al. 2013). However, when there are resources and 
                                                 
4 The expectation theory by Vroom (1964) assumes that every individual believes that when he 
behaves in a certain way, he will obtain certain result called an expectation result (outcome 
expectancy). Each result has a value or appeal to a particular person. 
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opportunities that support it (such as support from top management or trusted 
channel), he may report the violation. In other words, the PBC has implications for a 
strong motivation toward intention, where the greater the individual’s PBC, the 
greater the possibility or intention to perform the behavior (Ajzen 2005). Previous 
research has found a significant relationship between the PBC and the intentions of 
whistleblowing (Alleyne et al. 2016; Park and Blenkinsopp 2009), ethical behavior 
(Alleyne and Phillips 2011; Bobek et al. 2007; Cieslewicz 2016) and sustainability 
reporting (Thoradeniya et al. 2015). From the above discussion, the following 
hypothesis can be derived: 
H2: Perceived behavioral control has a positive effect on both internal and external 
whistleblowing intentions. 
2.4. Independence Commitment and Whistleblowing Intentions 
Gendron et al. (2006) defined IC as “the extent to which the individual 
accountant considers auditor independence as a key attribute of the profession, and 
believes that regulatory standards of auditor independence (issued by the profession 
and/or external regulatory agencies) should be rigorously binding and enforced in the 
public accounting domain.” In the context of the audit, the IC is considered to be the 
key for objectivity and integrity, so this is an important factor in favor of 
whistleblowing intentions. Thus, public accountants must act and be seen as an 
independent in both tasks and performances. When a public accountant has a high IC 
and is confronted with ethical issues, he will be inclined to take action to report 
unethical behavior.  Previous research has found a significant relationship between 
the independence of the commitment and intentions of whistleblowing (Alleyne 
2016; Taylor and Curtis, 2010), as well as between role conflict and role ambiguity 
(Ahmad and Taylor 2009). From the above discussion, the following hypothesis can 
be derived: 
H3: Independence commitment has a positive effect on both internal and external 
whistleblowing intentions. 
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2.5. Personal Responsibility for Reporting and Whistle-blowing Intentions 
Graham (1986) defined personal responsibility as “the psychological state 
of feeling personally responsible for responding to an issue of principle .......” (p. 39). 
In the auditing profession, the rights and responsibilities of professional auditors to 
report errors are set in a professional code of conduct and regulations (for example, 
ISA), so that PRR is regarded as one important component in deciding to report 
violations (Dalton and Radtke 2013; Lowe et al. 2015). When the whistleblowing is 
seen as a prosocial behavior / moral obligation in a company, PRR will influence the 
decision of individuals to report defiance by the moral sense of whether it is right or 
wrong (Alleyne et al. 2013; Miceli and Near 1984). So individuals who have a high 
PRR more likely to report violations (Schultz et al. 1993). Previous research has 
found a significant relationship between the PRR and the intention of whistleblowing 
(Alleyne et al. 2016; Dalton and Radtke 2013; Kaplan and Whitecotton 2001; Lowe 
et al. 2015; Schultz et al. 1993). From the above discussion, the following hypothesis 
can be derived: 
H4: Personal responsibility for reporting has a positive effect on both internal and 
external whistleblowing intentions. 
2.6. Personal Cost of Reporting and Whistleblowing Intentions 
Dalton and Radtke (2013) stated that “PCR is the perceived harm or 
discomfort that could result from reporting wrongdoing.” Various studies have shown 
that retaliation or threat can hinder the whistleblower’s decision to report violations 
(Bedard et al. 2008; Liyanarachchi and Adler 2011; Miceli 2013; Rehg et al. 2008). 
The threat may be a rejection of raises, unfair performance appraisal, the reduction of 
duties, reduction in communication with colleagues / management or termination 
from the company. Previous research has found a significant negative relationship 
between PCR and the intention of whistleblowing (Alleyne et al. 2016; Kaplan and 
Whitecotton 2001; Schultz et al. 1993). From the above discussion, the following 
hypothesis can be derived: 
H5: Personal cost for reporting has a negative effect on both internal and external 
whistleblowing intentions. 
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2.7. Moderating Effect of Perceived Organisational Support on Individual-Level 
Antecedents and Whistle-blowing Intentions 
According to organizational support theory (OST; (Eisenberger et al. 
1986; Rhoades and Eisenberger 2002), employees develop a general perception 
concerning the extent to which the organization values their contributions and cares 
about their well-being (perceived organizational support or POS). So the POS is 
highly dependent on the individual attribution by assessing whether certain actions 
are favorable or unfavorable and in accordance with the goals and objectives of the 
organization (Kurtessis et al. 2015). Similarly, within audit firms, public accountants 
will feel comfortable in the decision to blow the whistle when there is high support 
from the organization (Alleyne et al. 2013). However, POS by itself may not 
stimulate the intention to report errors (Alleyne et al. 2016), but it could when 
combined with the characteristics of the individual levels of the auditor. 
A public accountant may have ATW, PBC, IC and PRR to report errors / 
unethical behaviors that occur in the workplace, but he also needs to consider the 
POS available before deciding to report it. So the POS can reinforce the intention of 
whistleblowing, where the auditor may be more confident and have the courage to 
report any violations without fear / worry. In addition, the auditor should also assess 
the level of support expected when deciding whether to report any errors, thus 
reducing PCR. In other words, the POS will provide assurance that the auditors are 
free from the risk of retaliation. Previous research has found a significant relationship 
between the ATW, PBC, IC, PRR and PCR with the intention of whistleblowing 
moderated by POS (Alleyne et al. 2016). From the above discussion, the following 
hypothesis can be derived: 
H6a: Perceived organizational support will moderate the relationship of ATW with 
both internal and external whistleblowing intentions. 
H6b: Perceived organizational support will moderate the relationships of PBC with 
both internal and external whistleblowing intentions. 
H6c: Perceived organizational support will moderate the relationships of IC with 
both internal and external whistleblowing intentions. 
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H6d: Perceived organizational support will moderate the relationships of PRR with 
both internal and external whistleblowing intentions. 
H6e: Perceived organizational support will moderate the relationships of PCR with 
both internal and external whistleblowing intentions. 
************ 
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
************ 
 
2.8. Moderating Effect of Team Norms on Individual-Level Antecedents and 
Whistleblowing Intentions 
Feldman (1984) stated that TNs is the informal rules that groups adopt to 
regulate and regularize group members’ behavior. Previous research has explained 
the close relationship between the TNs and unethical behavior (Dunn and Schweitzer 
2006; Narayanan et al. 2006; Zhong et al. 2006). The extent to which an individual is 
involved in a particular behavior is largely dependent on the norms inherent in the 
group where he became a member (Alleyne et al. 2013). The concept of norms in the 
context of unethical behavior has received much attention from researchers, where 
the perceived social pressure and subjective norms are two important factors that 
influence ethical decision making (Ajzen 2005; Buchan 2005). Therefore, we argue 
that the norms in the audit team may also affect the behavior of individual members, 
where an auditor will report any errors that occur in both the assignment or 
engagement when the TNs is in line with professional standards and codes of 
conduct. So the TNs will strengthen the relationship between the ATW, PBC, IC, 
PRR and PCR with the intention of whistleblowing (Alleyne et al. 2013; Narayanan 
et al. 2006). From the above discussion, the following hypothesis can be derived: 
H7a: Team norms will moderate the relationship of ATW with both internal and 
external whistleblowing intentions. 
H7b: Team norms will moderate the relationship of PBC with both internal and 
external whistleblowing intentions. 
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H7c: Team norms will moderate the relationship of IC with both internal and 
external whistleblowing intentions. 
H7d: Team norms will moderate the relationship of PRR with both internal and 
external whistleblowing intentions. 
H7e: Team norms will moderate the relationship of PCR with both internal and 
external whistleblowing intentions. 
2.9. Moderating Effect of Perceived Moral Intensity on Individual-Level Antecedents 
and Whistleblowing Intentions 
Jones (1991) stated that the individual ethical decision-making model 
should place emphasis on the characteristics of ethical issues. Based on the issue-
contingency perspective, Jones (1991) introduced a construct called moral intensity 
with which the determining factor are ethical decision making and behavior. We 
adopt this perspective that assumes individuals more easily identify ethical issues 
when they have high moral intensity. Moral intensity is composed of six factors: (1) 
magnitude of consequences, (2) social consensus, (3) probability of effect, (4) 
temporal immediacy, (5) proximity and (6) concentration of effect. However, 
according to Curtis and Taylor (2009), only three factors  are relevant in the context 
of the audit, which include the magnitude of consequences, probability of effect and 
proximity, and these three factors can affect the auditor’s whistleblowing intentions 
(p. 198).  
The first factor, magnitude of consequences, refers to the sum of harm (or 
benefits) done to victims (or beneficiaries) in terms of themoral act in question (Jones 
1991, p. 374). The magnitude of consequences includes the auditor blowing the 
whistle when a violation of auditing standards and professional codes of conduct only 
result in significant losses. The second factor, the probability of effect of the moral 
act in question, is a joint function of the probability that the act in question will 
actually take place and cause the harm (benefit) predicted (Jones 1991, p. 375). When 
a whistleblower is faced with the decision to blow the whistle, error usually occurs. 
However, the possibility that a mistake will cause harm in the future is a matter that 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
  
 
 
Pa
ge
13
 
must be considered. Finally, the proximity of the moral issue is the feeling of 
nearness (social, cultural, psychological or physical) that the moral agent has for 
victims (beneficiaries) of the evil (beneficial) act in question (Jones 1991, p. 376). 
Generally, people tend to report a violation that is potentially detrimental to their 
group members (such as co-workers or family members), but they are less likely to 
report it when they personally do not know each other. Previous research has found a 
significant relationship between moral intensity and the intention to behave ethically 
(Singer 1996; Coram et al. 2008; McMahon and Harvey 2007; Valentine and 
Hollingworth 2012) and the intention of whistleblowing (Clements and Shawver 
2011; Curtis and Taylor 2009; Taylor and Curtis 2010; Shawver and Clements 2015; 
Shawver et al. 2015). Another study from Beu, Buckley, and Harvey (2003) showed 
that the moral intensity moderates the relationship between several independent 
variables and the intention to behave ethically. From the above discussion, the 
following hypothesis can be derived: 
H8a: Moral intensity will moderate the relationship of ATW with both internal and 
external whistleblowing intentions. 
H8b: Moral intensity will moderate the relationship of PBC with both internal and 
external whistleblowing intentions. 
H8c: Moral intensity will moderate the relationship of IC with both internal and 
external whistleblowing intentions. 
H8d: Moral intensity will moderate the relationship of PRR with both internal and 
external whistleblowing intentions. 
H8e: Moral intensity will moderate the relationship of PCR with both internal and 
external whistleblowing intentions. 
3. Research Method 
3.1. Sample Selection and Data Collection 
Respondents in this study were public accountants who worked on the 
audit firm in Indonesia, that is affiliated with both the Big 4 and non-Big 4 (non-
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affiliated).5 We are collected data using online questionnaires by placing the item in 
question to measure each construct in this study on a virtual network. Web links to 
the questionnaire later in an email to the audit firm (headquarters) are scattered in 
various cities in Indonesia. Email addresses from the audit firm were obtained from 
the directory of the Indonesian Institute of Certified Public Accountants (IAPI) for 
2015. Based on that directory, 400 audit firms contacted a total of 1,000 staff 
auditors.6 After sending the original invitation to complete the survey, the research 
team sent two additional reminder emails. Finally, to improve the response rate, the 
research team started a more personal approach by calling the targeted respondent. In 
addition, respondents were reassured about the confidentiality and anonymity of their 
responses and that their personal information would not be disclosed. Furthermore, 
for the purpose of testing non-response bias, as suggested by Oppenheim (2001), the 
length of time given to respondents to complete this survey was 2 months.  
At the end of this process, which took place between September-
December 2015, we obtained 278 questionnaire responses, of which there were 22 
incomplete questionnaires, so the questionnaires that were valid and could be used in 
this study were 256 with a 25.6% response rate. Of the 256 completed questionnaires, 
35.3% came from audit firms affiliated with the Big 4, and the remaining 64.7% came 
from audit firms that are not affiliated (non-Big 4). Results of the t-test showed that 
there was no difference in the statistically significant response (P < 0.05) between 
public accountants who came from the Big 4 and non-Big 4. We also used the 
Wilcoxon test for comparison. In addition, the statistical test results also showed that 
there was no significant difference between the response in the initial 10 respondents 
compared to the 10 late respondents 7, which means there is no problem of non-
                                                 
5 Audit firms (Big 4) are affiliated in Indonesia, including, among others, PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
with KAP Tanudiredja, Wibisana & Rekan; Deloitte with KAP Osman Bing Satrio; Ernst and Young 
with KAP Purwantono, Suherman & Surja; and KPMG with KAP Sidharta and Widjaja. 
6 The number of registered auditors certified as CPA in IAPI until June 2016 was 1628, while the 
number of registered audit firms was 525 (plus branches). 
7 We compared 10 samples beginning with 10 samples at the end to obtain more precise results. Most 
studies generally compare the overall sample before and after the cut-off. Differences in the distance 
are too close and may lead to biased analysis. 
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response bias that would affect the systematic results (Dillman et al. 2014). We also 
conducted testing for common method bias (Podsakoff et al. 2003; MacKenzie and 
Podsakoff 2012) using a full collinearity approach (Kock 2015). The analysis showed 
that the value obtained AFVIF < 3.3, thus indicating no common bias method 
problem occurred. 
We believe that the number of questionnaires was obtained by the 
absolute standards statistical test based on comparison with studies carried out 
recently, for example, studies of Cieslewicz (2016) with 93 respondents, Curtis and 
Taylor (2009) with 122 respondents, and Robertson et al. (2011) with 129 
respondents. In addition, some rules were applied to prove the adequacy of the 
sample size so that it did not affect the results of this study. Using Cohen (1992) 
rules, the minimum sample required is 114 (power = 80%, significance level of 1%, 
R2 < 0.25 and minimum number of arrows pointing at a construct ≤ 8). In addition, by 
using the software G * power, the minimum sample required for this study was 148 
(power = 0.80, effect size = 0.15, significance level of 1% and number of predictors ≤ 
8). So, by setting all the existing rules, the study had a sample size that is larger than 
the minimum size recommended.8 
The summary of the respondent’s demographic profile can be described 
as follows. Of the 256 respondents, 61.6% were male, with an average age of 35.4 
years. In terms of positions, 37.4% of the sample comprised senior audit staff and 
62.6% was junior audit staff. As for qualifications, 61.2% held a college degree, 
70.8% of the sample had professional qualifications, and 40.2% of the sample had 
completed the CPA professional qualification. 
3.2. Measurement of Variables 
The instrument used to measure each variable in this study consists of two 
parts.9 The first part asked for the respondents’ demographic information such as 
gender, age, education level, work experience, and job title. The second part 
                                                 
8 Although this study uses a component-based approach (PLS-SEM), the adequacy of the sample size 
remains a concern for researchers. 
9  The original copy of the questionnaire is available from the author. 
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presented the scenarios and questions related to the variables to be studied. Given the 
difficulty in gaining access to the object in order to observe the real unethical 
behavior, a scenario approach is commonly used in research in the field of accounting 
and ethics (for example, Curtis and Taylor 2009; Dalton and Radtke 2013; 
Liyanarachchi and Adler 2011; Robertson et al. 2011; Shawver et al. 2015). This 
approach illustrates a specific case and respondents were asked to respond and put 
themselves as an actor in such situations. The scenario used in this study was adopted 
from the scenario used by Clements and Shawver (2011), Curtis and Taylor (2009), 
Kaplan and Whitecotton (2001) and Schultz et al. (1993) highlighting violations of 
auditing standards and the auditors’ professional code of conduct.10   
3.2.1.  Whistleblowing Intentions 
For the constructs of the whistleblowing intentions, both internally and 
externally, each item was measured using four questions and was adopted from Park 
and Blenkinsopp (2009). Respondents were asked about whether they would report 
an error or violation that occurs within the company, either internally or externally, 
by selecting one of the seven (7) options using Likert scale from 1 = not at all to 7 = 
very much.  The values obtained validity and reliability of the analytical results 
measurement model for both the loading factors so that rho_A is > 0.70 and the value 
is AVE > 0.50, thus meeting the recommended requirements (Hair et al. 2017). Park 
and Blenkinsopp (2009) and Alleyne et al. (2016) also obtained similar results when 
using this instrument. Table 1 below shows the indicators and outcome measurement 
model for this variable. 
3.2.2. Attitudes toward Whistleblowing 
The ATW constructs were measured using a five-item questionnaire 
adopted from Park and Blenkinsopp (2009). Respondents were asked about the 
critical consequences of reporting errors or violations occurring in the audit firm in 
the scenario by selecting one of the seven (7) options using a Likert scale from 1 = 
                                                 
10 The use of scenarios is more effective to give stimuli to the auditor in making ethical decisions when 
faced with certain situations. 
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not very true to 7 = very true. The values obtained validity and reliability of the 
analytical results measurement model for both the loading factors so that rho_A is > 
0.70 and the value is AVE > 0.50, thus meeting the recommended requirements (Hair 
et al. 2017; Latan and Ghozali 2015). Park and Blenkinsopp (2009) and Alleyne et al. 
(2016) also obtained similar results when using this instrument. Table 2A below 
shows the indicators and outcome measurement model for this variable. 
************ 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
************ 
 
************ 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
************ 
 
3.2.3. Perceived Behavioral Control 
PBC constructs are measured using a four-item questionnaire adopted 
from Park and Blenkinsopp (2009). Respondents will be asked about how easy or 
difficult it is to report errors or violations occurring in the audit firm by selecting one 
of the seven (7) options using a Likert scale from 1 = not likely to 7 = very likely.  
The values obtained validity and reliability of the analytical results measurement 
model for both the loading factors so that rho_A is > 0.70 and the value is AVE > 
0.50 (Hair et al. 2017; Latan and Ghozali 2015). Park and Blenkinsopp (2009) and 
Alleyne et al. (2016) also obtained similar results when using this instrument. Table 
2B above shows the indicators and outcome measurement model for this variable. 
3.2.4. Independence Commitment 
IC constructs were measured using a four-item questionnaire adopted 
from Gendron et al. (2006). Respondents were asked to reflect on their current 
organization and in the context of the scenario and assess the level of IC by selecting 
one of the seven (7) options using a Likert scale from 1 = completely disagree to 7 = 
completely agree. The values obtained validity and reliability of the analytical results 
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measurement model for both the loading factors so that rho_A is > 0.70 and the value 
is AVE > 0.50, thus meeting the recommended requirements (Hair et al. 2017; Latan 
and Ghozali 2015). Gendron et al. (2006) and Alleyne et al. (2016) also obtained 
similar results when using this instrument. Table 3A below shows the indicators and 
outcome measurement model for this variable. 
3.2.5. Personal Responsibility for Reporting and Personal Cost of Reporting 
PRR and PCR constructs were measured respectively by using the single 
item in question adopted from Schultz et al. (1993). Respondents were asked to rate 
their personal responsibilities (duties or obligations) in reporting violations, while the 
second questian asked respondents to rate their personal costs (i.e., issues, risks and 
discomfort) as a public accountant in reporting errors that occur. Each item in 
question was measured using a Likert scale of 7 points, namely from 1 = very low to 
7 = very high. The validity and reliability for these two variables do not need to be 
tested (Hair et al. 2017; Latan and Ghozali 2015). Table 3B and 3C below show the 
indicator for this variable. 
************ 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
************ 
 
3.2.6. Perceived Organisational Support, Team Norms and Perceived Moral Intensity  
POS constructs were measured using an eight-item questionnaire adopted 
from Eisenberger et al. (1986) and Rhoades and Eisenberger (2002). Respondents 
were asked to reflect on their current organization and demonstrate how 
organizational support in the workplace, by selecting one of the seven (7) options 
using a Likert scale from 1 = completely disagree to 7 = completely agree. As for the 
PMI constructs measured, they were using a six-item questionnaire adopted from 
Clements and Shawver (2011). Respondents were asked to provide feedback on the 
scenarios to assess the level of moral intensity with 1 = strongly agree to 7 = strongly 
disagree. The values obtained validity and reliability of the analytical results 
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measurement model for both the loading factors so that rho_A is > 0.70 and the value 
is AVE > 0.50  (Hair et al. 2017; Latan and Ghozali 2015). Table 4 below shows the 
indicators and outcome measurement model for this variable. 
************ 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
************ 
 
************ 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
************ 
 
Finally, we tested the discriminant validity for all variables in the model. 
Table 5 above shows the results of testing discriminant validity (divergent) using 
Fornell-Lacker criterion and heterotrait-monotrait ratio (HTMT). From the analysis 
above it can be seen that the square root of the AVE on diagonal lines is greater than 
the correlation between the constructs in the model, which means it can be concluded 
that all variables in this research model meet the discriminant validity. We also tested 
the discriminant validity using HTMT, and the results of the analysis in the table 
above show that the value of HTMT was smaller than 0.90, which means that it meets 
the recommended requirements (Hair et al., 2017; Latan & Ghozali, 2015). 
3.3. Data Analysis 
Once we are sure that the adequacy of the sample size and a preliminary 
analysis has been fulfilled, we analyzed the data by using a Partial Least Squares-
Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) approach. The main purpose of the PLS-
SEM is to analyze of complex situations where data and prior information are 
relatively scarce (Wold, 1977, 1982).11 Previous research in this area is also using 
PLS-SEM as an analytical tool (Buchan 2005; Cieslewicz 2016; Dalton and Radtke 
                                                 
11   When researchers do not know the data from the population common factor or composites, the use 
of PLS-SEM is a safer option (see Sarstedt, Hair, Ringle, Thiele, & Gudergan, 2016). 
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2013; Thoradeniya et al. 2015). Because PLS-SEM is distribution-free, then some 
assumptions such as normality is not necessary, but still maintain the assumption of 
such quality of measurement model and structural model will be described in the 
following sections.12 
4. Results 
We tested the hypothesis by using a PLS-SEM approach. PLS-SEM 
election is made on the grounds that this approach can test causal-predictive 
relationships between the latent variables simultaneously to support the weak theory 
(Joreskog and Wold 1982).13 PLS-SEM enables researchers to examine the 
relationship with the complex variables, which is not possible using the covariance-
based SEM approach or traditional regression (Hair et al., 2017; Latan & Ghozali, 
2015).14 Testing PLS will pass through two stages, namely the measurement model 
and structural model. The measurement model is intended to assess the validity 
(convergent and discriminant) and reliability of each indicator forming latent 
constructs (Latan & Ghozali, 2015). Evaluation of the measurement model is already 
done in the previous section.15 As for the evaluation of the structural model, it is 
intended to assess the quality of the model and examine the research hypothesis with 
the help of the SmartPLS 3 program (Ringle, Wende & Becker, 2015) through the 
process of bootstrapping (bias-corrected and accelerated), with a 5,000 resample that 
obtained structural model evaluation results in Table 6 below. 
In Table 6, it can be seen that the internal / external whistleblowing 
(IWB/ EWB) is able to be explained by individual-level antecedents (e.g., ATW, 
PBC, IC, PRR, PCR) of 0640/0612 or 64% / 61.2%. This value indicates that the 
                                                 
12 See Henseler, Hubona & Ray (2017) to update the guidelines for the evaluation criteria of 
measurement and structural models in PLS-SEM. 
13  PLS-SEM is a modeling approach is wrong if without justification proper use (Guide & Ketokivi 
2015). 
14 The CB-SEM approach will have problems when estimating models that are very complex. In 
contrast, the traditional regression approach has many limitations such that it cannot test the model 
simultaneously and based on the total score of the variable. 
15 Evaluation of the measurement model includes the assessment of the loading factor, average 
variance extracted (AVE), rho_A, and HTMT assessment as a discriminant validity assessment, 
which is more superior than the Fornell-Larcker criterion. 
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explanatory power of the predictor variables was approaching substantial (Latan and 
Ghozali, 2015). The resulting effect size value of each predictor variable in the model 
ranged from 0.01 to 0.09, which is included in the category of small to medium. The 
value variance inflation factor (VIF) is generated for all the independent variables in 
the model < 3.3, which means that there was no collinearity trouble between the 
predictor variables. The Q2 predictive relevance value generated each endogenous 
variable as excellent i.e > 0, which means that the model has predictive relevance. 
This is supported by the value of goodness of fit that is generated through the 
standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR) that is equal to 0.062 < 0.080 and 
the normed fix index (NFI) 0802 > 0.80, which means that our model fits the 
empirical data. 
************ 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
************ 
4.1. Hypothesis Testing (Direct Effect) 
We tested the hypothesis (direct effect) before testing the hypothesis 
(interaction) with a view of the coefficient parameter and the significant value 
generated from the 95% bias corrected confidence intervals of each independent 
variable. As shown in Table 7, it can be seen that the ATW  and PBC positively and 
significantly effected either to internal whistleblowing ATWoIWB β = 0.283, p = 
0.003; PCBoIWB β = 0.396, p = 0.001 and external whistleblowing ATWoEWB 
β = 0.283, p = 0.003; PCBoEWB β = 0.290, p = 0.002 (one-tailed),  thus fully 
supporting the H1 and H2. These results are consistent with the TPB stating that the 
ATW and PBC are important predictors in influencing behavior. Public accountants 
who have high ATW and PBC will tend to have a high whistleblowing intention in 
reporting errors that occur. Furthermore, variables IC, PCR and PCR were also 
positive and significant for both internal whistleblowing ICoIWB β = 0.260, p = 
0.003; PRRoIWB β = 0.268, p = 0.001; PCRoIWB β = -0.029, p = 0.001 and 
external whistleblowing ICoEWB β = 0.236, p = 0.008; PRRoEWB β = 0.384, p 
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= 0.002; PCRoEWB β = -0.073, p = 0.001 (one-tailed)16, thus fully supporting the 
H3, H4 and H5. Public accountants who have high IC and PRR tend to act in 
accordance with professional standards and a code of ethics, so they will have strong 
whistleblowing intentions for any violations. Conversely, if the PCR is perceived 
high / low by the auditor, the whistleblowing intentions will depend on the cost / 
benefit perceived. So, the lower the risk, the auditors’ whistleblowing intentions will 
be higher in the error reporting. 
The results support previous studies (Alleyne et al., 2016; Park & 
Blenkinsopp, 2009; Dalton & Radtke, 2013; Kaplan & Whitecotton, 2001; Lowe et 
al., 2015; Schultz et al., 1993; Taylor & Curtis, 2010; Trongmateerut & Sweeney, 
2013) and extend the generalization of the findings in different contexts. Because 
Indonesia is currently has increased corporate governance significantly, supported by 
the adoption of International Accounting Standards such as ISA and IFRS recently, 
perhaps a direct implication on improving the intention of auditor in reporting wrong-
doings. In addition, with the support of the WPA and the availability of a trusted 
channel in Indonesia, the auditor in Indonesia starting today is not reluctant to blow 
the whistle. Both these factors play an important role in influencing the decision of 
the auditor's report wrong-doings in the context of Indonesia. 
************ 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
************ 
4.2. Hypothesis Testing (Interaction Effect) 
We tested the hypothesis interactions using the orthogonalization 
approach.17 This approach was chosen because it produces an accurate estimate, has a 
high predictive accuracy and is able to minimize problems collinearity. The results of 
the analysis of interactions can be seen in Table 8 below. In Table 8, it can be seen 
                                                 
16 We tested the hypothesis by using the one-tailed test rather than the two-tailed. Testing the 
hypothesis by using one-tailed is more appropriate when the hypothesis direction is clear so as to 
minimize the type II error. 
17  Besides the orthogonalization approach, there is also a product indicator and two-stage approach to 
test the interaction effects. 
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that the hypotheses 6, 7 and 8 are supported partially, whereas POS, TNs and PMI 
may moderate the relationship between the individual-level antecedents and the 
intentions of whistleblowing. 
************ 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
************ 
This shows that the organizational support and norms applied in the organization play 
an important role in improving the auditors’ ethical attitudes, and the consequence is 
that they have the higher intention of whistleblowing to report any errors or 
violations. Also, the moral intensity possessed by the auditor will assist in 
considering any magnitude of the consequences, the probability of future losses and 
the close relationship with the organization or individual in decisions or actions to 
blow the whistle. Organizational support will assist the auditor in the face of 
perceived stress and norms shaping the character of a public accountant. Finally, with 
the moral intensity owned, the public accountant can act with high prudence. 
The results support previous studies (Alleyne et al., 2016; Alleyne et al., 
2013; Clements & Shawver, 2011; Curtis & Taylor, 2009; Narayanan et al., 2006; 
Taylor & Curtis, 2010; Shawver & Clements, 2015). Given the social norms and 
moral behavior are still strong in Indonesia, with the freedom to act, it becomes a 
supporting factor for auditors in improving the intention to report wrong-doings 
without fear. 
5. Conclusion 
Our study contributes by providing new insights into the relationship 
between the individual levels of the antecedents to the intention whistleblowing 
moderated by POS, TNs and PMI. We answered the call of Alleyne et al. (2013) to 
test their model in the context of an external audit. In this paper, we argue that the 
intention of the whistleblowing (both internal and external), depending on the 
individual-level antecedents (i.e., ATW, PBC, IC, PRR and PCR), was directly and 
partially moderated by POS, TNs and PMI. The findings confirm our predictions. 
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We support the argument that the individual-level antecedents can 
increase the public accountant’ intentions of whistleblowing. We have found models 
of whistleblowing where there is a more comprehensive understanding of the 
relationship between individual-level antecedents to the intention of whistleblowing 
reinforced by moderating variables (e.g., POS, TN and PMI). In the practical 
implications, these findings provide a deep understanding of how the audit firm must 
be selective in choosing the audit staff that upholds professional and ethical standards 
of behavior and that is expected to report any errors that occur. In addition, there is a 
need for a training program that provides guidance to staff auditors to resolve the 
ethical conflict and improve the professional attitude, IC and PRR. Audit firms also 
need to implement appropriate strategies to improve the auditors’ whistleblowing 
intentions and reduce the fear of reprisal (e.g., by holding a whistleblower hotline or 
reporting anonymity). Finally, senior management within the audit firm needs to 
implement positive norms, in accordance with professional ethics, so that the audit 
staff can have responsibility for the company in reporting errors. 
There are several limitations to this study that should be noted. First, some 
of the variables in this study were measured using a single item. This may reduce the 
content validity of the construct being measured. Secondly, interaction testing was 
only partially carried out, without examining the simultaneous effects of the three 
variables moderator.18 The different results may be obtained when considering it. 
Third, this study did not consider the effect of extraneous variables that might 
interfere with the results of this study (such as age, gender or total tenure). Finally, 
this study only tested the whistleblowing intentions without testing the actual 
behavior. 
Subsequent research could look into the relationship between the 
individual-level antecedents and the intentions of whistleblowing mediated by several 
variables such as trust in the supervisor /organization (Seifert et al. 2014), perceived 
benefit /seriousness (Dalton and Radtke 2013) or organizational culture (Kaptein 
                                                 
18   It aims to reduce the complexity of the model and multicollinearity problems that may arise. This is 
also in line with the proposition put forward by Alleyne et al. (2013). 
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2011). Furthermore, a comparative study to examine the influence of extraneous 
variables is also needed (Erkmen et al. 2014). Replication studies on the other 
subjects and organizations will also allow access to generalize the findings of this 
study. Overall, the researchers feel that it is necessary to replicate this study using a 
qualitative approach / fsQCA (Henik 2015), which might provide new avenues for 
future studies in this research area. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual model of whistleblowing intentions among public accountants. 
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Table 1 
Construct Indicators and Measurement Model of Whistleblowing Intentions 
Indicators/Items Code FLa AVE rho_A 
Internal whistleblowing (IWB) 
     Report it to the appropriate persons within the firm 
     Use the reporting channels inside of the firm 
     Let upper-level management know about it 
     Tell my supervisor about it 
 
IWB1 
IWB2 
IWB3 
IWB4 
 
0.856 
0.853 
0.869 
0.771 
 
 
0.703 
 
 
0.868 
External whistleblowing (EWB) 
       Report it to the appropriate authorities outside of the firm 
     Use the reporting channels outside of the firm 
     Provide information to outside agencies 
     Inform the public about it 
 
EWB1 
EWB2 
EWB3 
EWB4 
 
0.886 
0.837 
0.785 
0.792 
 
 
0.682 
 
 
0.856 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Construct Indicators and Measurement Model of ATW & PBC 
Indicators/Items Code FLa AVE rho_A 
A). Attitudes toward whistleblowing (ATW) 
          Prevention of harm to the firm 
          Control of unethical behavior 
          Enhances public interest 
          One’s duty as an employee 
          Morally appropriate 
 
ATW1 
ATW2 
ATW3 
ATW4 
ATW5 
 
0.794 
0.864 
0.794 
0.847 
0.804 
 
 
 
0.674 
 
 
 
0.879 
B). Perceived behavioral control (PBC) 
          The audit firm’s hinders reporting (or ignoring it) 
          Difficulties to be faced in the process of reporting 
          Reporting likely to be ineffective in ending the  
wrongdoing 
          Retaliation by the audit firm 
 
PBC1 
PBC2 
PBC3 
 
PBC4 
 
0.770 
0.808 
0.781 
 
0.681 
 
 
 
0.580 
 
 
 
0.761 
aFL is factor loading 
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Table 3 
Construct Indicators and Measurement Model of IC, PCR & PRR 
Indicators/Items Code FL AVE rho_A 
A). Independence commitment (IC) 
         I believe that independence is one of the main foundations 
of the accounting and  auditing profession. 
I believe that the profession’s independence requirements 
must be strictly enforced in every sphere of activity in 
which public accounting firms are involved. 
I think the profession would be more highly regarded if the 
profession’s independence requirements for auditors in 
public practice were more rigorous. 
I think that stakeholders in general (e.g. business 
community) would benefit if the profession’s independence 
requirements in public practice were more rigorous. 
 
IC1 
 
IC2 
 
 
IC3 
 
 
IC4 
 
 
0.839 
 
0.884 
 
 
0.872 
 
 
0.854 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.744 
 
 
 
 
 
0.885 
B). Personal responsibility for reporting (PRR) 
         Personal responsibility for reporting 
C). Personal cost of reporting (PCR) 
         Personal cost of reporting 
 
PRR1 
 
PCR1 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Construct Indicators and Measurement Model of POS, TNs & PMI 
Indicators/Items Code FL AVE rho_A 
A). Perceived Organizational Support (POS) 
         My organization cares about my opinions. 
My organization really cares about my well-being. 
My organization strongly considers my goals and values. 
Help is available from my organization when I have a problem. 
My organization would forgive an honest mistake on my part. 
If given the opportunity, my organization would take advantage 
of me.* 
My organization shows very little concern for me.* 
My organization is willing to help me if I need a special favor. 
 
POS1 
POS2 
POS3 
POS4 
POS5 
POS6 
POS7 
POS8 
 
0.678 
0.752 
0.834 
0.818 
0.841 
0.878 
0.874 
0.868 
 
 
 
 
0.673 
 
 
 
 
0.930 
B). Team Norms (TN) 
   Team norms 
C). Perceived Moral Intensity (PMI) 
         Should not do the proposed action. 
         Approving the bad debt adjustment is wrong. 
Approving the bad debt adjustment will cause harm. 
Approving the bad debt adjustment will not cause any harm. 
If the CEO is a personal friend, approving the bad debt 
adjustment is wrong. 
Approving the bad debt adjustment will harm very few people if 
any. 
 
TN1 
 
PMI1 
PMI2 
PMI3 
PMI4 
 
PMI5 
PMI6 
 
– 
 
0.758 
0.859 
0.880 
0.888 
 
0.836 
0.791 
 
– 
 
 
 
 
0.700 
 
– 
 
 
 
 
0.920 
 
 
 
* Items reverse-scored 
 
 Table 5 
Correlations and Discriminant Validity Results 
Construct 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
ATW 
EWB 
IC 
IWB 
PBC 
PCR 
PMI 
POS 
PRR 
TN 
0.821 
0.659* 
0.728* 
0.694* 
0.686* 
-0.635* 
0.746* 
0.723* 
0.580* 
0.442* 
0.760 
0.826 
0.679* 
0.776* 
0.665* 
-0.649* 
0.590* 
0.678* 
0.680* 
0.360* 
0.826 
0.781 
0.862 
0.706* 
0.738* 
-0.645* 
0.667* 
0.729* 
0.673* 
0.425* 
 
0.796 
0.802 
0.806 
0.838 
0.722* 
-0.639* 
0.570* 
0.694* 
0.647* 
0.431* 
0.841 
0.830 
0.802 
0.846 
0.761 
-0.596 
0.560* 
0.667* 
0.623* 
0.523* 
0.677 
0.698 
0.686 
0.680 
0.683 
1.000 
-0.577* 
-0.607* 
-0.631* 
-0.369* 
0.830 
0.666 
0.739 
0.634 
0.668 
0.604 
0.836 
0.804* 
0.531* 
0.388* 
0.801 
0.762 
0.803 
0.769 
0.794 
0.630 
0.771 
0.821 
0.577* 
0.366* 
0.619 
0.736 
0.716 
0.692 
0.715 
0.631 
0.555 
0.599 
1.000 
0.301* 
0.471 
0.386 
0.452 
0.459 
0.597 
0.369 
0.404 
0.381 
0.301 
1.000 
Note: *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
         Diagonal and italicized elements are the square roots of the AVE (average variance extracted). 
         Below the diagonal elements are the correlations between  the construct values. Above the diagonal elements are the HTMT values. 
 
 
Table 6 
Structural Model Results 
Constructs R2 Adj. R2 f2 Q2 VIF SRMR NFI AFVIF 
Attitude (ATW) 
Behavioral Control (PBC) 
Independence Commitment (IC) 
Personal Responsibility (PRR) 
Personal Cost for Reporting (PCR) 
Organizational Support (POS) 
Team Norms (TN) 
Moral Intensity (PMI) 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
0.049 – 0.032 
0.092 – 0.032 
0.017 – 0.011 
0.091 – 0.035 
0.026 – 0.042 
0.011 – 0.091 
0.010 – 0.080 
0.016 – 0.092 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
2.553 
2.584 
3.166 
2.157 
2.125 
2.343 
2.148 
2.593 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
Internal Whistleblowing (IWB) 0.647 0.640 – 0.649 – 0.062 0.802 2.815 
External Whistleblowing (EWB) 0.619 0.612 – 0.621 – 0.062 0.802 2.815 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Relationships between Variables (Direct Effect) 
Structural path Coef (β) Std. 
deviation 
P-Values 
95% BCa CI Conclusion 
ATW o IWB  
ATW o EWB 
0.211 
0.177 
0.065 
0.068 
0.001** 
0.004** 
(0.003, 0.283)** 
(0.003, 0.283)** 
H1 supported 
PBC o IWB 
PBC o EWB 
0.290 
0.176 
0.067 
0.068 
0.000** 
0.005** 
(0.001, 0.396)** 
(0.002, 0.290)** 
H2 supported 
IC o IWB 
IC o EWB 
0.138 
0.117 
0.071 
0.072 
0.026* 
0.048* 
(0.003, 0.260)** 
(0.008, 0.236)** 
H3 supported 
PRR oIWB 
PRR o EWB 
0.162 
0.273 
0.062 
0.068 
0.004** 
0.000** 
(0.001, 0.268)** 
(0.002, 0.384)** 
H4 supported 
PCR o IWB -0.140 0.072 0.026* (0.001, -0.029)** H5 supported 
PCR o EWB -0.185 0.072 0.005** (0.001, -0.073)**  
      Note: **, * statistically significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Relationships between Variables (Interaction Effect) 
Structural path Coef (β) S.D P-Values 95% BCa CI Conclusion 
ATW x POS o IW 
ATW x POS o EWB 
0.141 
0.143 
0.062 
0.053 
0.012* 
0.004** 
(0.004, 0.271)** 
(0.001, 0.288)** 
H6a fully supported 
PBC x POS o IWB 
PBC x POS o EWB 
0.220 
0.027 
0.067 
0.054 
0.001** 
0.308 
(0.001, 0.346)** 
(0.093, 0.072) 
H6b partially supported 
IC x POS o IWB 
IC x POS o EWB 
0.077 
0.138 
0.057 
0.071 
0.090 
0.026* 
(0.060, 0.088) 
(0.002, 0.236)** 
H6c partially supported 
PRR x POS oIWB 
PRR x POS o EWB 
0.048 
0.258 
0.052 
0.060 
0.176 
0.000** 
(0.073, 0.086) 
(0.000, 0.462)** 
H6d partially supported 
PCR x POS o IWB 
PCR x POS o EWB 
0.128 
0.125 
0.060 
0.065 
0.016* 
0.028* 
(0.003, 0.232)** 
(0.002, 0.254)** 
H6e fully supported 
ATW x TN o IWB 
ATW x TN o EWB 
0.114 
0.030 
0.057 
0.051 
0.023* 
0.277 
(0.004, 0.218)** 
(0.058, 0.098) 
H7a partially supported 
 
PBC x TN o IWB 
PBC x TN o EWB 
0.132 
0.081 
0.060 
0.053 
0.014* 
0.063 
(0.002, 0.261)** 
(0.052, 0.093) 
H7b partially supported 
IC x TN o IWB 
IC x TN o EWB 
0.079 
0.117 
0.069 
0.070 
0.123 
0.046* 
(0.097, 0.102) 
(0.032, 0.219)* 
H7c partially supported 
PRR x TN oIWB 
PRR x TN o EWB 
0.156 
0.279 
0.057 
0.069 
0.003** 
0.000** 
(0.001, 0.327)** 
(0.000, 0.413)** 
H7d fully supported 
PCR x TN o IWB 0.085 0.065 0.095 (0.056, 0.103) H7e partially supported 
PCR x TN o EWB 0.184 0.071 0.005** (0.002, 0.329)**  
ATW x PMI o IWB 
ATW x PMI o EWB 
0.104 
0.090 
0.054 
0.055 
0.027* 
0.049* 
(0.012, 0.261)* 
(0.014, 0.189)* 
H8a fully supported 
PBC x PMI o IWB 
PBC x PMI o EWB 
0.102 
0.144 
0.062 
0.062 
0.049* 
0.010** 
(0.012, 0.196)* 
(0.001, 0.327)** 
H8b fully supported 
IC x PMI o IWB 
IC x PMI o EWB 
0.087 
0.054 
0.057 
0.056 
0.063 
0.165 
(0.053, 0.975) 
(0.085, 0.982) 
H8c not supported 
PRR x PMI oIWB 
PRR x PMI o EWB 
0.016 
0.273 
0.053 
0.067 
0.383 
0.000** 
(0.138, 0.065) 
(0.000, 0.437)** 
H8d partially supported 
PCR x PMI o IWB 0.031 0.052 0.276 (0.146, 0.067) H8e partially supported 
PCR x PMI o EWB 0.105 0.060 0.041* (0.015, 0.232)*  
             Note: **, * statistically significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
 
